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THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff and Appellee, : 
v. 
STEVEN CORY HAWS : Case No. 200220181 -CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant and Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4)(i) 
(1953) whereby the Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the 
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (1953) confers original jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court over 
appeals from the district court involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. Whether the trial court erred in failing to suppress Appellant's inculpatory 
statements obtained during custodial interrogation because a law enforcement officer 
gave him a defective "Miranda"warning in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the United States Constitution. 
Standard of Review: This issue involves a mixed question of 
fact and law. The court on appeal reviews the trial courts' 
factual findings underlying the denial of a motion to suppress 
for clear error, while conclusions of law are reviewed for 
1 
correctness. State v. Galli. 967 P.2d 930,933 (Utah 1998) citing 
State v. Trover, 910 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Utah 1995). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE FOR REVIEW 
This issue was preserved for appeal by way of Appellant's filing his Motion to 
Suppress Defendant's Statement and Memorandum in Support filed on April 19,2001 in the 
Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County before the Honorable Ann M. Boyden, 
Judge. (R. 99-105) Said Motion cited inadequacies the law enforcement officer made in 
giving Appellant his "Miranda" warning and argued that the Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution and Miranda and its progeny, including both State and Federal case law, 
demanded that Appellant's statements made thereafter be suppressed. (Id.) Appellant also 
filed a Reply Memorandum to the State's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Suppress 
on May 10,2001. (R. 116-122). Further, a hearing on Appellant's Motion to Suppress was 
held May 18, 2001. (R. 402, 1-48) The trial court's Findings of Facts and Conclusions of 
Law denying Defendant's Motion were filed May 30,2001 with the Third District Court in 
and for Salt Lake County. (R. 128-131) Said Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law are 
contained in Addendum A. At trial, defense counsel cross-examined the law enforcement 
officer who claimed that he "Mirandized" Appellant meaningfully, despite objections by the 
prosecutor that this was a legal issue which had already been decided by the trial court. (R. 
405 at 199-205, 262) 
II. Whether the trial court erred in failing to suppress Appellant's inculpatory statements 
made during custodial interrogation because he did not voluntarily, knowingly and 
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intentionally waive his rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution. 
Standard of Review: This issue involves a mixed question of 
fact and law. The court on appeal reviews the trial courts' 
factual findings underlying the denial of a motion to suppress 
for clear error, while conclusions of law are reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Galli. 967 P.2d930,933 (Utah 1998) citing 
State v. Trover. 910 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Utah 1995). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE FOR REVIEW 
This issue was preserved in the trial court by Appellant's filing of his Motion to 
Suppress Defendant's Statement, Memorandum in Support and Request for Hearing filed 
in the Third Judicial District Court on May 22, 2001. (R. 124-26) The Motion and 
accompanying Memorandum asked the trial court to enter an Order suppressing 
Appellant's alleged post-arrest statements and argued that the statements were not a 
knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of his rights under both the Fifth and Sixth 
amendments to the United States Constitution. (R. 124-126) The memorandum cited to 
both state and federal case law in support of its argument. (Id.) A hearing on the matter 
was held June 13, 2001 before the Honorable Ann M. Boyden, Judge. (R. 403, 1-65) 
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law denying Appellant's Motion were filed July 
31, 2001 in the Third District Court. (R. 173-177). Those Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law are contained in Addendum B. At trial, defense counsel again 
conducted a meaningful cross-examination of the law enforcement officer regarding 
Appellant's "waiver" of his Miranda rights. (R. 405 at 264-279) 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, ORDINANCES. 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
The pertinent parts of the following constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, 
rules and regulations are contained in Addendum D. 
Constitutional Provisions 
U.S. Const. Amends. V, VI, XIV 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
On September 11, 2000, Appellant was charged by Information with Clandestine 
Lab, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4(l)(a) and/or (b) 
(1953). (R. 2) A co-defendant, Anthony Jackson, (hereinafter, "Jackson") was charged in 
the same information with the same crime. (Id.) Jackson later accepted a plea bargain 
from the State in which he pled guilty to a lesser included offense which was a second 
degree felony. (R. 405 at 395) As part of the plea agreement, the State dropped a third 
degree, Possession of a Controlled Substance charge which was filed against Jackson 
after officers at the jail discovered methamphetamine on his person when he was booked 
into jail for the clandestine lab offense. (Id.) Jackson testified on behalf of the State at 
Appellant's trial. (R. 405 at 306-403). 
At the preliminary hearing held April 10, 200, the trial court heard testimony from 
Detective Nate Thompson who had been employed with the South Jordan Police 
Department at the date of Defendant's arrest. (R. 401 at 6-20). Following the hearing, the 
court bound the Defendant over as charged in the information. (R. 401 at 53-4) 
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On April 19, 2001, Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress Defendant's Statement 
which included a Memorandum in Support of the motion. (R. 99-105) The motion sought 
an order from the court suppressing Defendant's alleged statements arguing Detective 
Thompson gave an incomplete and therefore invalid Miranda warning to the Defendant. 
(Id.) The State filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress on 
May 7, 2001. (R. 109-15) Defendant then filed a Reply Memorandum to the State's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Suppress on May 10, 2001. (R. 116- 22). 
Finally, a hearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress was held May 18, 2001. (R. 402 at 
1-48) Detective Thompson testified at the hearing (R. 402 at 4-31) The trial court's 
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law denying Defendant's Motion were filed May 
30, 2001. (R. 128-31) Revised Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were filed with 
the court on June 19, 2001. (R. 158-61) 
On May 22, 2001, Defendant filed a second Motion to Suppress Defendant's 
Statement arguing that the statements should be suppressed because Defendant did not 
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive his Fifth Amendment rights. (R. 124-27) 
The State filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to Suppress on June 13, 
2001. (R. 134-42) The trial court held a hearing on the Motion on that same day, June 13, 
2001. (R. 403 at 1-64) Detective Thompson testified at the hearing. (R. 403 at 12-46) 
Following the hearing on the Motion, the State filed a Second Amended Information in 
which it added "Iodine" in addition to psuedoephedrine and red phosphorus, as a 
precursor chemical. (R. 144-45,403 at 62) Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law 
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relating to the second motion to suppress were filed with the court on July 31, 2001. (R. 
173-77) 
Following a jury trial held December 12-17,2001 the jury convicted defendant of 
Operation of a Clandestine Laboratory, a First Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37D-4 (1953). (R. 365) The jury also found the defendant guilty of each of the 
three enhancements charged by the State. (R. 366) 
On January 28, 2002, the trial court committed defendant to the Utah State Prison 
for a period of not less than five years to life. (R. 388-89). The trial judge signed 
defendant's Sentence, Judgment and Commitment on January 29, 2002. (Id.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Sometime prior to August 19, 2000, the South Jordan Police Department received 
complaints regarding traffic at a home located at 2868 West Quintail Circle. (R. 404 at 
37) Detective Nate Thompson (hereinafter "Thompson") was assigned to conduct 
surveillance on the home. (Id.) Prior to this date, Thompson's training regarding the 
detection and investigation of criminal activity and clandestine laboratories in particular 
included his attendance at a three-month training at Peace Officer Standards and Training 
and his attendance at two different safety courses relating to clandestine laboratories. (R. 
404 at 124-25. Thompson was not clan-lab certified on August 19, 2000 (R. 404 at 125) 
Thompson conducted surveillance of the home at (R. 404 at 130), without the aid 
of any other officers or detectives, on three occasions. (Id.) Thompson's surveillance 
revealed that there was traffic at the home in the late hours of the evening and late hours 
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of the night. (Id.) In addition to his surveillance of the home, Thompson conducted traffic 
stops on people leaving the home. (Id.) Thompson could not recall in his testimony what 
specific traffic violations occurred which caused him to stop the cars leaving the home, 
but that one of the reasons he stopped the cars was "just basically to see who was inside 
the house. (R. 404 at 38; 130-31) Thompson also conducted a "trash run" of the home 
where he went through the garbage belonging to the home. (R. 404 at 38) Thompson 
found items in the garbage that led him to believe that someone inside the home may have 
been cooking methamphetamine. (R. 404 at 38-9) 
Thompson testified at trial that he had no information regarding Appellant at any 
time prior to his arrest on August 19, 2000. (R. 404 at 132) During his surveillance of the 
home, Thompson did not have any indication that Appellant was inside the home, nor did 
he ever specifically see Appellant walking around inside of the house. (R. 404 at 131-32) 
Appellant was not involved in any of the traffic stops of people leaving the home. (Id.) 
No residency papers or bills or anything else uncovered in Thompson's trash run 
conducted prior to August 19, 2000 indicated that Appellant lived in the home. (Id.) 
Following his surveillance, Thompson requested a received a search warrant to be 
served on the home. (R. 404 at 39) On August 19, 2000 Thompson, along with SWAT 
teams from Sandy, West Jordan and South Jordan, executed the search warrant on the 
home. (R. 404 at 40) Thompson waited inside a home across the street from 2868 West 
Quintail Circle while the SWAT team members served the warrant. (R. 404 at 133) 
Thompson waited one or two minutes following SWAT's entry into the home before 
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leaving the house across the street and joining the SWAT team in the home located at 
2868 West Quintail Circle. (Id.) When Thompson entered the house, everyone inside the 
house at the time the warrant was served was handcuffed and located in the rooms in 
which they were found. (R. 404 at 134) Inside the house and handcuffed were the 
following eight people: Anthony Jackson (hereinafter "Jackson"), Terri Emmons 
(hereinafter "Emmons"), Jennifer Reynolds (hereinafter "Reynolds), Tina Tueller 
(hereinafter "Tueller"), Appellant, Mark Steiner (hereinafter "Steiner"), Rick Hamby 
(hereinafter "Hamby") and Matt Burr (hereinafter "Burr"). (R. 405 at 174-75) 
Following his entry into the home, SWAT team members took him directly 
upstairs to the room characterized as the master bedroom. (R. 404 at 49). SWAT 
members then showed Thompson what they believed was iodine sitting on the sink in 
what was characterized at the master bathroom. (Id.) Thompson observed Steiner, 
Hamby and Appellant inside the master bedroom. (Id.) Thompson testified that Appellant 
had been taken into custody and was handcuffed behind his back. (R. 404 at 50) Steiner 
and Hamby were also handcuffed.(R. 404 at 134) Following the service of the warrant 
and investigation of the home, Steiner was arrested for other drug charges that he had, 
but he was not charged with any lab violations. (R. 405 at 178) Hamby was later released 
from the home at 2868 West Quintail Circle and no criminal charges were filed against 
him in relation to the service of this warrant. (R. 405 at 182) 
After being shown the alleged iodine and observing the three handcuffed men in 
the master bedroom, Thompson and SWAT team members took all of the arrested persons 
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to the kitchen/foyer/dining room area of the home. (R. 404 at 50-51) Thompson put 
Appellant in the dining room area of the home. (R. 404 at 52) Thompson testified that he 
then went "[b]ack up to the master bedroom to see exactly what we had in the kitchen, 
and then I was directed downstairs to where the meth lab was found.(Id.) Thompson did 
not search the master bedroom at this time. (Id.) 
Upon going downstairs, Thompson observed people handcuffed in the basement 
area. (R. 404 at 62) Thompson testified that the basement area was where the "actual 
meth lab was" [found]. (Id.) Jackson was one of the persons found in the basement 
bedroom which was later determined to belong to him. (R. 404 at 64) 
At some point in time after leaving the basement area of the home, Thompson 
asked another law enforcement officer, Sergeant Worlton (hereinafter "Worlton"), to 
interview each one of the suspects and gather their names. (R. 404 at 68) Worlton 
interviewed everyone except for Appellant. (R. 404 at 69) Instead, Thompson took 
Appellant from where he had left him in the dining room area, and walked him up to the 
master bedroom to interview him. (R. 404 at 70) Thompson wanted to take Appellant to a 
location "kind of out of the way, [where] there wasn't people coming in and out of the 
house. (Id.) Thompson conducted the interview by himself with no other officers or 
suspects in the master bedroom. (R. 404 at 71) Appellant remained handcuffed, with his 
arms restrained behind his back. (Id; R. 405 at 194) In an effort to make Appellant more 
comfortable, Thompson took a cigarette from the TV stand, placed it in Appellant's 
mouth, and lit it for him. (R. 403 at 26; R. 404 at 71-72; R. 405 at 194) Thompson 
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conducted his interview with Appellant holding the cigarette in his mouth throughout the 
course of the interview. (R. 404 at 72) Thompson testified the he explained and/or 
advised Appellant of his Miranda rights (R.401 at 13, 23-25; R. 402 at 21-24; R. 403 at 
30; R. 404 at 74, 198-99). Thompson stated that during the course of this interview, 
Appellant admitted to being the "chem guy," and that he was a "junkie" and needed meth 
to survive. (R. 401 at 15; R. 402 at 13-14; R. 403 at 75 and 80; R. 405 at 266-67). 
Thompson stated that Appellant also stated that he would take the "chems" to Tony 
downstairs and later get meth. (R. 401 at 15-16) Following the interview, Appellant was 
transported to jail. (R. 403 at 33-34). On September 18, 2000, the State of Utah filed an 
Information charging Appellant and Jackson with the Clandestine Lab offense as set forth 
in Utah Code Ann. § 58-37D-4 (1953). (R. 2-4) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court should have suppressed Appellant's alleged statements and 
excluded them from the State's evidence against Appellant at trial. Failure to suppress 
Appellant's statements violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the United 
States Constitution. Appellant was given a defective Miranda warning and did not waive 
his rights under Miranda and its progeny. 
Review of the facts and law associated with the suppression issues in this case 
support a finding that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Appellant's alleged 
statements at trial. The trial court's rulings prejudiced Appellant. Other than Appellant's 
statements, the only other evidence the State had connecting Appellant with the crime 
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suspect from the outset in that he was an admitted drug addict, an admitted liar, and his 
testimony was subject to a plea bargain. Jackson's testimony was further shown to be 
11n inlibk' wlirn hi , iuli i1 irslii'iMp »»" ihi'V' ^xjinii1 tfi*»i» v\\ i>l'p;ita( \ppclla««i 
Realizing the Jackson was not going to incriminate Appellant, the State requested and 
was granted a recess to go into the holding cell to talk with Jackson, Defense counsel 
asked noiding cell during the prosecutor's meeting with Jackson, but 
the trial court denied this request When I;n ksnn in I lint Jimd Iiunrth lnll<m in Ins 
meeting with the prosecutor, his testimony changed from exculpating Appellant to 
directly incriminating Appellant. 
i iiements, there existed a real 
probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different, since the Sl;il< In I i I 
physical evidence tying Appellant to the crime. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS OBTAINED 
AFTER INTERROGATING OFFICER FAILED TO ADVISE HIM OF 
ALL OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AS REQUIRED IN 
MIRANDA V. ARIZONA.1 
The trial court violated Appellant's Fifth Amendment right against self-
'384 s i3(>, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) 
incrimination and his Due Process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution when it denied Appellant's Motion to Suppress Statements. 
(Appellant's Motion to Suppress Statements is located in the Record at 99-106) 
The United States Supreme Court held in Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 
1602,16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) that law enforcement officers must give certain warnings prior 
to custodial interrogation of a suspect before the suspect's statement could be admitted in 
evidence. 
The circumstances in the case at bar demonstrate that Appellant was in custody at 
the time of the interview for purposes of Miranda. Following service of the search 
warrant, Appellant, along with everyone else found in the home, was in handcuffs. (R 404 
at 134) During the interview, Appellant remained handcuffed, his arms restrained behind 
his back. (Id; R. 405 at 194) Appellant and Thompson were alone in the master bedroom 
of the home when the interview was conducted. (R. 404 at 71) Appellant was not free to 
leave. 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed the custody issue in Salt Lake City v. Carner, 
662 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1983). The Court noted that custody is likely when police 
questioning of a suspect shifts from merely that which is investigatory to that which is 
accusatory. 662 P.2d at 1170. Thompson's questions posed to Appellant were clearly 
accusatory. Thompson testified that he asked Appellant whether the iodine in the master 
bathroom belonged to him. (R. 401 at 14; R. 405 at 266) 
In Miranda, the Supreme Court outlined the warnings law enforcement must give 
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(In1 itiYiisnl prioi In i in ilii-ili.il iiili'iii^'iiliuii ,is follows: 
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain 
silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that 
he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford 
an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning is he so 
desires. 
384 U.S. at 479, 86 S.Ct. At 1630, 10 L.Ed.2d at 726. 
The United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed Miranda v. Arizona in 
Dickerson v. t ..-.. . . - (2000). In Dickerson, 
Defendant made a moti i * <: • - * 1 1 1 . 1 1 I in• 11 u I  mi i il 
received "Miranda warnings". The District Court granted the motion and the government 
took an interlocutory appeal to the United States District Court for the 4th Circuit Tha* 
• *sd the Disti ict Coi n I: , detern tli ling that the Miranda deuM*- ^ . 
constitutional holding. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, holding that 
Miranda is a constitutional decision which could not be overruled by an Act of Congress, 
.iiiiiil 11 mi I her lhal "Miranda and its progeny in this Court govern the admissibility of 
statements made during custodial inlnio^alinn IIII liollli stiilr .mil InitT.il*imnls' 5'M) 11 S. 
at 448, 120 S.Ct at 2328, 147 L.Ed.2d at 405. 
One reiteration of the Miranda rights in the State of Utah is found in State v. 
MI am "7C> P 2d V1i m m i in Ir'i'.v n in Sijani, ilu I Jiah Supn inc < nun tii'si i IIH'ILI Hit holding 
in Miranda v. Arizona and wrote: 
The Miranda warning originated out of the landmark United States 
Supreme Court case of Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 
L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). That case outlined those basic rights of which the 
accused must be adequately informed before any of his statements made to 
law enforcement officers may be used against him. 
779P.2dat223. 
Defense counsel for Appellant filed his Motion to Suppress on April 19, 2001, 
nine days after the preliminary hearing which took place April 10, 2001 (R. 99-106) 
The memorandum included with the Motion argued that Thompson failed to warn 
Appellant of all of the rights afforded to him under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
of the United States Constitution as mandated by the United States Supreme Court's 
decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602,16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The 
Motion specifically argued that Thompson gave an incomplete warning to Appellant, in 
that he failed to advise Appellant of his right to have an attorney provided at no cost, and 
therefore the statements should be suppressed. (R. at ((-106) 
Appellant's Motion relied on Thompson's testimony given at both the preliminary 
hearing held on April 10, 2001(R. 401 at5-37) and at the hearing on his Motion to 
Suppress held May 18, 2001(R. 402). The trial court denied Appellant's motion. (R. at 
158-161) 
Thompson's testimony elicited at the May 18, 2001 Suppression Hearing (R. 402 
at 4-31) regarding the facts surrounding his interview of Appellant was markedly 
different than his testimony given at the April 10, 2001 Preliminary Hearing (R. 401 at 5-
37) Review of Thompson's testimony given at both proceedings as well as review of the 
trial court's Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law suggest that in denying 
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Appellant 
preliminary hearing and suppression motion testimony and therefore erred in both its 
factual and legal conclusions. 
" I 11 mi ^  p r e ill ill in 11 ii mi i I i i i ' i i i iiiiiii11!11 ii'liir S l i i ' i r I I S I M M I T I I i i i | i i i u i m i l m i I i "m 1111111.111 iiiiiii 
whether he "Mirandized" Appellant. (R. 401 at 13). Thompson answered simply that "I 
explained to him his rights." (Id.) When asked on direct whether Appellant waived his 
rights, Thompson stated, "I le waived both of them." (id., emphasis added) 
I )n cross-examination, Thompson mis t(iics(io»inl „ii«iuni n riii'din^ (lie Mnanda 
rights he gave to Appellant prior to interviewing him. The text of that examination is as 
follows: 
Q i 11 i l IIIIIII i ln IIIIIII In IIIIIII \ IIIIIII in i i i i ' i t i l K il I I I M M I I I I I I I K ' I ' I I I I I I I I I nil i l l i l l i i l c i i, new n u t s i i lnl i t 
start? 
A: I explained his rights to him as per Miranda. 
Q: I see you're referring again to your report. I ask for purposes of cross-examination 
that you not refer to that report unless you state on the record that you think it necessary 
to do so. I would like just to ask you questions about your recollection right now, if you 
would. Is that all right? 
A; Sure. 
Q: So you talked to him abou: KI, Miranda rights. *ne what you told him, to the 
best of your recollection. 
A: Explained that he had a right to an attorney 
Q: All right 
j • 
III 
Q: All right. 
A: If he didn't want to talk to me he didn't have to. If he wanted his attorney present, 
before questioning, we wouldn't talk to him until his attorney was present. Explained that 
anything he said would be used against him in court. 
Q: So how many rights did you explain to him, then? 
A: Two. 
Q: You consider what you have just explained to me right there as just two rights? 
A: Explained that he has the right to remain silent, right to an attorney. 
Q: So that's what you explained to him; just those two rights? 
A: Right to all the stuff I told you. 
Q: So I'm a little unclear. Did you explain to him four rights? Or did you explain to 
him two rights? 
A: I explained to him he had the right to remain silent and he had a right to an attorney. 
Q: Those are the two things you explained to him? 
A: That's correct. 
Q: Nothing else? 
A: I explained tha t . . . 
MS. BEATON: Well Judge, I mean I think what Mr. Shapiro is not understanding is the 
officer considers those to be two rights, and then he goes further and explains if you 
choose to talk to us that can be used against you. 
THE COURT: This is cross-examination and Mr. Shapiro is entitled to try to pin him 
down any way he can. I'm not sure what your objection is. 
MS. BEATON: Well, I guess it's argumentative. 
MR. SHAPIRO: Judge, I'll back up and start again. 
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THE COURT: Well, let's not start aga»;. . — asked him what he said to the defendant. 
He told you what he said, and you asked him how many rights that was. He said there 
were two rights, identified what those two right are. Go from there. 
(BY Mxv. ^nAPIRO; e 
'!»u not to spe^ ^ you? 
i Y: Correct. Right to remain silent. 
ri
* And the other one was? 
(R. 401 at 23-25) 
Review of Thompson's above testimony given at the preliminary hearing 
demonstrates that I hompson s warning to Appellant did not meet the constitutional 
In order to fully apprise a person interrogated of the extent of his rights 
under this system then, it is necessary to warn him not only that he has a 
right to consult with an attorney, but also that if he is indigent a lawyer will 
be appointed to represent him. Without this additional warning, the 
admonition of the right to consult with counsel would often be understood 
as meaning only that he can consult with a lawyer if he has one or has the 
funds to obtain one. The warning of a right to counsel would be hollow if 
not couched in terms that would convey to the indigent - the person most 
often subjected to interrogation- the knowledge that he too has a right to 
have counsel present. 
3841 1 S ; it 4 73, 86 S C t \ it 1627, 161 Ed 2< 169 1 (1966) 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Strain agreed and said "that if police propose 
to interrogate a person they must make known to him that he is entitled to a lawyer and 
111 il il hi i annul affut! uin , •• t,n\ , u w ill he provide. . ; nim prior to any interrogation." 
i o 
779 P.2d at 224 (1989). 
The record cited supra demonstrates that Thompson failed to advise Appellant that 
if he could not afford an attorney, one would be provided to him at no cost. This is true 
despite the ample amount of opportunity Thompson was given to testify as that he did, in 
fact, advise Appellant of that right. Defense counsel repeatedly asked Thompson to 
explain what rights he gave to Appellant prior to the interview. (R. 401 at 23-25) In 
response, Thompson repeatedly stated that he only advised Appellant of his right to 
remain silent and his right to have an attorney present. (Id.) Thompson never testified at 
the preliminary hearing that he advised Appellant of his right to have an attorney 
appointed for him at no cost, even upon re-direct examination by the State. (R. 401 at 35-
36) The holding set forth in Miranda and Strain is not satisfied unless all elements of 
the Miranda warning are given to the accused. Failure to provide even one element is 
nonetheless a failure for constitutional purposes. 384 U.S.at 473, 86 S.Ct. at 1627,16 
L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); 779 P.2d at 224 (Utah 1989) 
There is no reason to disbelieve Thompson's testimony given at the preliminary 
hearing regarding what rights he advised Appellant of prior to interrogating him. 
Thompson himself vouched for the credibility of his testimony that he had given at the 
preliminary hearing: testifying as follows on cross-examination by defense counsel at the 
suppression hearing on May 18, 2001: 
Q: When you left the preliminary hearing after it was held, did you believe that you 
had testified truthfully and accurately? 
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i did. 
\} ; Did you believe that you 'd left anything out? 
A: No. 
Q: 1 hil ' mi I I I 1 1 in i II", i l l i . i l ! "i i •' * I mi in in. in I'!" t i n * ' I in in in s i 1,1 k r s ? 
v-. 402 at 26-27) 
In contrast to his testimony given at the preliminary hearing, review of 
best, suspect, and at worst, coached or manufactured for purposes of answering 
Appellant 's Motion to Suppress. 
accuracy and truthfulness of his preliminary hearing testimony, 
Thompson testified i suppression hearin * 
preliminary hearing testimony.
 v 7 He testified that his error was his failure 
to advise Appellant that an attorney would be appointed to represent him "free of charge." 
hi | 'I Mniiiji«Mtfi t'vplanuul lli;'i 'I ' V M ' " ' I i p ic ' in i ' iu is IIIVII iim> (esliiiioin OLC HI u.'ii 
because he was "nervous" and "interrupted"when he testified on April 10, 2001 . (R. 402 
at 15 and 24)(See also Addendum C) 
e suppression hearing that he only became aware 
of his ""error" during a telephone conversation with the prosecutor wherein she < ii h I si ; " i 
him that he had left one part of the Miranda warning out of his testimony. (R. 402 at 25) 
He testified that this conversation with the prosecutor took place a "few days" after the 
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preliminary hearing. (Id.)(See also Addendum C) 
The trial court should have viewed Thompson's claim of "nervousness" with great 
caution. That testimony is incongruent with the rest of Thompson's testimony given at 
the suppression hearing and at trial, and there is no support in the preliminary hearing 
record which would support the claim of "nervousness". Instead, the weight of the 
evidence demonstrates that Thompson did not give Appellant a full and complete 
Miranda warning. 
Thompson testified that he had from seven to eight and a half years of experience 
as a police officer. (R. 401 at 6; R. 402 at 4-5, 19; R. 403 at 13; R. 404 at 33-36; R. 405 at 
164-72) He also testified that during that time, he had interrogated suspects and given the 
Miranda warnings on over one hundred occasions. (R. 402 at 19, R. 405 at 263) Although 
Thompson agreed that the Miranda warning is a "little bit long.", (R. 405 at 197), he 
testified repeatedly that he had never given an incomplete Miranda warning. (R. 402 at 
19; R. 405 at 263) Further, Thompson repeatedly testified that he could not remember 
what Appellant actually said to "waive" his rights under Miranda, but that it would have 
been a verbal response. (R. 401 at 132; R. 403 at 30-313 R. 404 at 74-754) 
2When asked by the State at the preliminary hearing what words Appellant used to waive 
his Miranda rights, Thompson answered: "I don't recall exactly what he said, but he would have 
had to have said yes or I would not have continued talking to him." 
3The State asked Thompson how Appellant responded "when he asked him, did he 
understand those rights . . ." Thompson answered, "Verbally." When asked what words 
Appellant used to waive his rights, Thompson stated, "I don't recall." (R. 403 at 30-31) The 
State then asked Thompson why he did not include in his written report what Appellant's "actual 
comment was to you when he waived those rights?" Thompson testified, "At the time I probably 
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Apparently Thompson ' r.v Election of events w;is lirlln • Ilini In " k 
other details. While Thompson testified that he remembered walking Appellant up the 
stairs to the master bedroom (R 402 \ it 11; R • !()4 at 70, R 405 at 191), leaving the door 
room at Appel lant ' s request, placing it into his mouth, and lighting it (R. 404 at 71-72; R. 
405 at 194-95) 
llu'u: i'. .MI .ill1 >( I mi i in1 ILII Ik I Il MI (»(ii nil iii 11 it* pri 'linmiarv hearing transcript that 
T h o m p s o n w a s " n e r v o u s " whi le testifying and s imply forge 
Appel lan t that if he could not afford an attorney, one wou ld be prov ided for h im at no 
cost, Thompson never indicated to the trial court that he w a s nervous . T h e record does 
liiiil iv l l iv l (diil In1 riitfatu'tl in ans miiimn tun < l i. i i ;utri isl ir nl m n, n-usni;-is Theh' i m> 
indication that Thompson asked for a drink of water. There is no indication that 
Thompson asked for a break in his testimony. Thompson makes no statement at all which 
M l I III | | | II11111 i M Ml" i l l III III II lit I IIIII , 
There also exists no indication in the preliminary hearinr • ^ I'hompsnn 
felt that he had been interrupted and therefore unable to recite the complete admonition he 
had gi \ en Appellant on August l regarding his rights, w h i l e Thompson had 
every occasion available to him throughou 
( : . .iii v\dc\i\ vhat he said to me, just that he did waive his rights." (R. 403 at 32) 
4The State asked Thompson twice at trial whether he remembered the specific or exact 
words Appellant used to "waive" his Miranda rights. Thompson's answers to both questions 
were, "I don't." 
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misstatements he had made either on direct, cross-examination, and re-direct, he never did 
so. Nor did Thompson ever indicated to the court that he was interrupted, and unable to 
complete his testimony as it related to his Miranda warnings given to Appellant on 
August 19, 2000. Thompson never requested that he be able to add to his testimony if he 
thought he had left anything out. He had every opportunity to correct the record, had he 
thought he was leaving anything out, on direct, cross-examination, and re-direct. 
Thompson never did this. Review of his preliminary hearing testimony reveals that his 
testimony was credible on April 10, 2001. 
Review of Thompson's testimony elicited at the suppression hearing on May 18, 
2001, however, supports a finding that his testimony regarding his "error" was suggested 
to him by the State. (See Addendum C) 
The trial court's ruling that the "Defendant was properly admonished of all of his 
Miranda rights," (R. 160) seems to be based on its 9th finding of fact which reads as 
follows: 
The Court finds that Det. Thompson's recitation of the Miranda warnings as 
[sic] the suppression hearing was the format used on August 19, 2000 when 
Defendant was interviewed. When Det. Thompson was asked to reiterate 
the warning, it flowed naturally. It was clear that he had the rights 
committed to memory. His preliminary hearing testimony was in summary 
form by using phrases such as "I explained." 
(R. 159) 
That Finding of Fact suggests that the trial court blatantly ignored the credibility of 
Thompson's testimony given at the preliminary hearing, thereby giving full consideration 
to Thompson's nonsensical suppression motion testimony. Further, the trial court's query 
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should have been focused on what rights Thompson advised Appellant on on August 19, 
2000. It is irrelevant that Thompson was able to reiterate the warning on May 18, 2000, 
and that it "flowed naturally" on that date. It is also irrelevant that Thompson had the 
Miranda rights committed to memory on May 18, 2001. His preliminary hearing 
testimony clearly demonstrates that he did not have those rights committed to memory on 
August 19, 2000. Thompson's other testimony given on May 18, 2000, supports a 
finding that his testimony was coached, and one can infer from that testimony contained 
in Addendum C that Thompson probably practiced reciting the Miranda warning prior to 
testifying. 
Review of the facts and law associated with the suppression issues in this case 
support a finding that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Appellant's alleged 
statements at trial. The trial court's rulings prejudiced Appellant. Other than Appellant's 
statements, the only other evidence the State had connecting Appellant with the crime 
charged was testimony of the co-defendant, Anthony Jackson. Jackson's testimony was 
suspect from the outset in that he was an admitted drug addict, an admitted liar, and his 
testimony was subject to a plea bargain. Jackson's testimony was further shown to be 
incredible when his initial testimony on direct examination exculpated Appellant. 
Realizing the Jackson was not going to incriminate Appellant, the State requested and 
was granted a recess to go into the holding cell to talk with Jackson. Defense counsel 
asked to be present in the holding cell during the prosecutor's meeting with Jackson, but 
the trial court denied this request. When Jackson took the stand directly following his 
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meeting with the prosecutor, his testimony changed from exculpating Appellant to 
directly incriminating Appellant. 
Had the trial court excluded Appellant's alleged statements, there existed a 
substantial probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different, since the 
State lacked physical evidence tying Appellant to the crime. 
Review of the facts and law associated with the suppression issues in this case 
support a finding that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Appellant's alleged 
statements at trial. The trial court's rulings prejudiced Appellant. Other than Appellant's 
statements, the only other evidence the State had connecting Appellant with the crime 
charged was testimony of the co-defendant, Anthony Jackson. Jackson's testimony was 
suspect from the outset in that he was an admitted drug addict, an admitted liar, and his 
testimony was subject to a plea bargain. (R. 405 at 384, 390, 394) Jackson's testimony 
was further shown to be incredible when his initial testimony on direct examination 
exculpated Appellant. Realizing the Jackson was not going to incriminate Appellant, the 
State requested and was granted a recess to go into the holding cell to talk with Jackson. 
Defense counsel asked to be present in the holding cell during the prosecutor's meeting 
with Jackson, but the trial court denied this request. When Jackson took the stand directly 
following his meeting with the prosecutor, his testimony changed from exculpating 
Appellant to directly incriminating Appellant. 
But for the admission of defendant's statements, the outcome of the trial may have 
been different because the jury certainly could have found that the iodine in the bathroom 
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could have belonged to Steiner, Hamby, or anyone else in the house. There was no 
evidence presented that Appellant had full and exclusive control over the master bedroom 
or the entire house, for that matter. There was no evidence presented of fingerprints tying 
Appellant to the iodine. There was no evidence presented to demonstrate that Appellant 
had ever had anything to do with the iodine, other than his own statements and those 
made by Jackson at trial. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING APPELLANT'S ALLEGED 
STATEMENTS BECAUSE THEY WERE OBTAINED WITHOUT A KNOWING. 
INTELLIGENT AND VOLUNTARY WAIVER, 
The trial court denied Appellant's second motion to suppress his statements 
following a hearing held on the matter June 13, 2001. (R. 403; 173-76) Appellant based 
the second motion on the grounds that Appellant's alleged waiver of his Miranda rights 
was not a product of a knowing, intelligent and voluntary decision. 
Denial of Appellant's second suppression motion violated his Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights - those rights which guaranteed him that he would not be compelled to 
incriminate himself and that he would be awarded all of his Due Process rights made 
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Appellant suffered prejudice when the trial court denied his motion to suppress and 
allowed his alleged, incriminating statements to be used against him at trial. See 
Argument on Point I: supra. 
Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) and its 
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progeny require that a valid waiver of Miranda rights be knowing, intelligent and 
voluntary.384 U.S. at 492, 86 S.Ct. at 1637. 
The voluntariness of a confession is determined by considering the totality of the 
circumstances in which it was made. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218, 266, 
(1973), State v. Rettenberger. 984 P.2d 1009 (Utah 1999). 
The circumstances in the case at bar surrounding the alleged Miranda 
admonishment and waiver are suspect for the argument set forth supra regarding the 
credibility of Thompson's testimony. 
When describing the facts and circumstances surrounding Appellant's alleged 
waiver of his rights, Thompson testified that at the time of the interview, Appellant did 
not appear to be nodding off or sleeping, did not have any visible injuries or complain of 
any injuries, did not appear to be under the influence of a controlled substance, and did 
not smell an odor of methamphetamine on the Appellant or in the master bedroom. (R. 
403 at 20 -29) 
The trial court should have viewed this testimony with great caution, as it is 
completely incompatible with the other circumstances of the case. An inference can be 
made from the record, again, that this particular testimony was the product of coaching by 
the State in preparation for the Appellant's second motion to suppress hearing. 
Thompson never testified at the preliminary hearing regarding his observations of the 
mental and physical condition of Appellant at the time of the interview. Further, 
Thompson's insistence that Appellant was not under the influence of anything is totally 
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inconsistent with his testimony explaining that he was investigating a home where there 
was a lot of late night traffic, indicating drug trafficking; that everyone in the house was 
awake at 4:21 a.m. when the warrant was served; that he suspected there would be a 
methamphetamine lab at the house (R. 401 at 7); and that there were indications of drug 
use throughout the master bedroom and the entire home (R. 401 at 9-12). 
Further, it is laughable and almost inconceivable that Thompson remembers every 
minor detail of the circumstances surrounding Appellant's alleged "waiver", yet from day 
one, he cannot remember what words Appellant actually used in waiving his rights. See 
footnotes 2,3, & 4, supra. The more likely scenario supported by the record, is that 
Appellant was smoking at the time of the alleged waiver, and said nothing to indicate that 
he waived his Miranda rights. Moreover, any alleged waiver, had it been made by 
Appellant, could not meet the "knowing and intelligent" burden of Miranda and its 
progeny, because it is clear from the preliminary hearing testimony that Thompson gave 
Appellant an incomplete warning. 
As argued supra, Thompson's testimony at the suppression hearings was not 
credible. The trial court abused its discretion in failing to weigh the evidence and in 
denying Appellant's motions, finding instead that the State had met its burden. 
Appellant's conviction at trial was a direct result of the admission of his alleged 
statements. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court committed reversible error when it denied Appellant's pre-trial motions 
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regarding the admissibility of statements taken in violation of Appellant's Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights to the United States Constitution as identified in Miranda 
v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) and its long progeny of both 
State and Federal case law. 
The trial court's Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law regarding both 
Appellant's Motions to Suppress constitute an abuse of discretion. Review of the record 
supports both factual findings and legal conclusions which in turn, support suppression of 
Appellant's alleged statements. Law enforcement failed to warn Appellant of all of his 
Miranda rights and Appellant did not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive those 
rights. 
Appellant respectfully asks this Court to reverse the trial court's rulings denying 
his Motions to Suppress Statements. 
DATED this ^ ^ day of September, 2002 
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Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
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REVISED FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
! CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
(DEFENDANT'S FIRST MOTION) 
Case No. 001916037 FS 
Judge ANN BOYDEN 
This Court denies Defendant's Motion to Suppress. The Court has reviewed the briefs 
submitted, heard testimony and considered the legal arguments by counsel. The Court does not 
believe there was a Miranda violation. The Court makes the following findings of fact and 
conclusions of law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On August 19, 2000, Det. Nathan Thompson ("Det. Thompson"), formerly of the South 
Jordan Police Department, went to 2868 Quintail Circle in South Jordan, Utah to participate in 
the execution of a search warrant. 
2. Det. Thompson requested Defendant come with him upstairs. Defendant was handcuffed at 
the time. 
M k \ u ^ %> V . « I » 
3. Det. Thompson took Defendant into the master bedroom. 
4. The two stood in the room while Det. Thompson, from memory, advised Defendant of his 
rights. Det. Thompson said, "You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will 
be used against you in a court of law. You have a right to an attorney. If you cannot afford to 
hire an attorney, one will be appointed to represent you. If you decide to answer questions 
without having an attorney present, you can stop answering questions at any time and you can 
also ask for an attorney at any time." 
5. Det. Thompson was not interrupted by Defendant during the course of the admonishment. 
6. Det. Thompson asked if Defendant understood his rights and if he would be willing to talk to 
him. Defendant answered in the affirmative to each question. 
7. Det. Thompson then proceeded to interview Defendant. The Defendant made incriminating 
statements. 
8. On April 10, 2001, a preliminary hearing was held before Judge Anthony B. Quinn. During 
examination, Det. Thompson failed to mention the "appointed counsel" provision of the Miranda 
warning. 
9. The Court finds that Det. Thompson's recitation of the Miranda warings as the suppression 
hearing w^the format used on August 19, 2000 when Defendant was interviewed. When Det. 
Thompson was asked to reiterate the warning, it flowed naturally. It was clear that he had the 
rights committed to memory. His preliminary hearing testimony was in summary form by using 
phrases such as "I explained." 
i i 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant was properly admonished of all of his Miranda rights. 
2. The law does not require an officer to read from a pre-printed card when advising a suspect of 
his or her Miranda rights. 
3. The preliminary hearing is not the appropriate setting to flesh out suppression issues. 
4. The State met its burden to show that Defendant was properly Mirandized on April 19,2000. 
DATED this day of June, 2001. 
Prepared by: 
NDA J. BEAT 
Assistant Attorney Genbral 
Approved as to Form: 
STEVEN G. SHAPIRO 
Attorney for Defendant 
JUDGE ANN BOYDEN 
Third Judicial District Court 
&>/(iUt 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing motion was mailed, postage 
pre-paid, to: 
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SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
Attorney for Defendant 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5444 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
(DEFENDANT'S SECOND 
MOTION) 
Case No. 001916037 FS 
Judge ANN M. BOYDEN 
This Court denies Defendant's Motion to Suppress. The Court has reviewed the 
briefs submitted, heard testimony and considered the legal arguments by counsel. The Court 
believes that Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. The Court 
makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On August 19, 2000, at 4:21 a.m., Detective Nathan Thompson ("Det. Thompson"), 
formerly of the South Jordan Police Department, went to 2868 Quintail Circle in South 
Jordan, Utah ("the residence"), to participate in the execution of a search warrant. 
1A 
2. Defendant and another man were found in the master bedroom of the residence. 
Neither of the two men appeared to have been sleeping. 
3. Defendant was brought to the front room of the residence and was handcuffed and 
seated on the couch. 
4. Other than during the initial entry, a gun was never drawn on Defendant. 
5. Det. Thompson was not wearing a uniform or a gun. 
6. During the entire time the officers were at the home, Defendant did not appear sleepy 
or injured. Defendant did not complain about being tired or injured in any way. He had no 
visible signs of injury. 
7. Approximately one hour to an hour and a half after entry into the home, Det. 
Thompson led Defendant upstairs to the master bedroom of the residence to conduct an 
interview. 
8. In order to make Defendant more comfortable, Det. Thompson allowed Defendant to 
smoke during the course of the interview. 
9. Det. Thompson and Defendant both stood in the room while Det. Thompson, from 
memory, admonished Defendant of his Miranda rights. 
10. Neither Det. Thompson nor Defendant was interrupted or distracted during the course 
of the admonishment or the subsequent interview. 
11. Defendant looked at Det. Thompson during the course of the admonishment and the 
subsequent interview and appeared to be concentrating on what Det. Thompson was saying. 
12. Defendant spoke to Det. Thompson in English and had no difficulty understanding 
the questions Det. Thompson was asking him. 
13. Defendant did not appear to be under the influence of any controlled substances 
during the course of the admonishment or the subsequent interview. Det. Thompson did not 
notice any signs or smells associated with the smoking or ingesting of methamphetamine or 
any other type of drug or alcohol. 
14. The master bedroom door remained open during the course of the admonishment and 
subsequent interview. 
15. Det. Thompson asked Defendant if he understood his rights and if he would be 
willing to talk to him. Defendant answered in the affirmative to each question. 
16. Defendant never made any effort to invoke his rights during the course of the 
interview. 
17. Det. Thompson proceeded to interview Defendant. Defendant made incriminating 
statements. He was only interviewed one time. 
18. The interview with Defendant took approximately ten minutes. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Given the totality of the circumstances, Defendant's Miranda waiver was made 
knowingly and intentionally. 
2. Defendant was not impaired in any way that would affect his ability to properly waive 
his Miranda rights. 
3. Defendant was not coerced, threatened or intimidated into waiving his Miranda 
rights. 
DATED this g / s i day of i3#2001. 
Prepared by: 
BKENDA J. BEATON 
Assistant Attorneyfeeneral 
Approved as to form: 
JANET MILLER 
Attorney for Defendant 
JUDGE ANN M. BOYDEN ^ ^ 
Third Judicial District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the forgoing motion was mailed, 
postage prepaid, to: 
JANET MILLER 
Attorney for Defendant 
10 West Broadway, Ste. 650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
DATED thiOV day of July, 2001. 
D'&NTELA N' JON* 
Legal Secretary 
Q. Now, as Ms. Beaton was asking for your explanation of 
why it was that your preliminary hearing testimony didn't 
include all of the elements that you just described to us this 
morning, your explanation was, in part, that you were 
interrupted; is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
MR. SHAPIRO: Judge, can I approach? 
THE COURT: Uh-huh, you may. 
MR. SHAPIRO: Showing you a transcript of the 
Preliminary Hearing held in this matter, I'm pointing you 
to — specifically to Page 23 of that transcript, and I'm 
asking you to take a look at Lines 13 through 23. Would you 
read over those for me? 
A. 13 through what? I am sorry. 
Q. 23. 
A, 13 through 23. 
Q. You talked to him about his Miranda rights. If you'd 
just read over to yourself. 
A. Oh, I'm sorry. 
THE COURT: What page? 
MR. SHAPIRO: 23. Does the Court have the whole copy 
of the transcript? 
THE COURT: I may have. It is accompanying the 
Defendant's memo. I have pages up to 55, it looks like, that 
are completed. 
MR. SHAPIRO: You have read over those, now, Officer? 
A. I will in just a second, please. 
Okay. 
Q. All right. Now, is your — is it your recollection 
that that's the way you testified during the preliminary 
hearing? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So you are not suggesting that there's anything 
inaccurate about the way the preliminary hearing transcript 
reads; are you? 
A. No. 
Q. That was your testimony? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. And starting then with Line 13, you'll 
see that I asked you a question which was to recount to the 
Court what you told the Defendant to the best of your 
Carlton Way, Registered Professional Reporter 
recollection; is that correct? 
A. Thatf s correct. 
Q. And your responses to that was what? 
A. According to the transcript? 
Q. Unless you remember it better off the top of your 
head. 
A. Just explained to him, according to the transcript, 
he had the right to an attorney. 
Q. All right. Now, at that time, did I interrupt you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And what did I say? 
A. "All right." 
Q. Did you consider that to be an interruption which 
threw you off your train of thought? 
A. It was an interruption, yes. 
Q. Did that make it so that you were then thinking 
unclearly? 
A. Not one specific thing, no. 
Q. All right. Then what's the next thing that happened? 
A. "Had a" — that he had the right to remain silent. 
Q. And you believe then that I interrupted you again? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you are saying that by my interrupting you by 
saying the word "all right," that that was something that 
interrupted your concentration? 
Carlton Way, Registered Professional Reporter 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. And then what happened? 
A. "If he didn?t want to talk to me, he didn't have to. 
If he wanted his attorney present, before questioning, we 
wouldn' t talk to him until the attorney was present.,f 
Explained that anything that was said would be used against 
him in court. 
Q. Do you believe that I interrupted you at the end of 
that statement that you made? 
A. Said, MSo how many rights did you explain to him, 
then?" 
Q. Is it your belief, Officer, that you didn't have a 
chance to fully answer the question that you were answering? 
A. Did you interrupt that statement? No. 
Q. Exactly. 
A. No. 
Q. I didn't interrupt you there? 
A. No. 
Q. You don' t feel that I cut you off in the middle of a 
phrase? 
A. No. 
Q. You had the opportunity to say everything that was an 
answer to that question? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you p e r c e i v e my quest ion to you on Line 13 as 
Carlton Way, Reg i s tered Profess ional Reporter 
being — tell me some of what you explained to the Defendant. 
Is that what the question was that you thought I was asking? 
A. No. 
Q, You thought I was asking you to tell everything that 
you explained; right? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And you did explain everything that you explained to 
the Defendant? 
A. I explained everything that day, yes. I explained — 
I explained what I explained in the transcript, yes. 
Q. Like you explained — like you testified earlier to 
Ms . Beaton, you very nervous. 
A. I was very nervous? 
Q. Were you very nervous? 
A. Very nervous. 
Q. And you weren't nervous this morning? 
A. No, not as nervous. 
Q. Why is that? 
A. I couldn't tell you. 
Q. Now, let's talk for a second about the conversations 
which you have had with Ms. Beaton. When did it come to your 
attention that your testimony there did not include all of the 
necessary components of the Miranda warning? When did you 
become aware of that? 
A. What date specifically? 
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Q- Yep. 
A. I don't recall what date. 
Q. How did you become aware of it? 
A. I was advised by Ms. Beaton. 
Q. That your testimony was inaccurate? 
A. That I had left one part of Miranda out, that I left 
part of the Miranda out. 
Q. So she told you, "Hey, look, you screwed this up." 
That's how you became aware of it? 
A. She told me that I left part of the Miranda out. 
Q. Tell me about that conversation. Approximately how 
long after the preliminary hearing did you have that 
conversation with Ms. Beaton? 
A. I couldn't tell you. 
Q. Approximately how long ago? 
A. It was over the phone. 
Q. Okay. About how long ago? 
A. Few days after the hearing, I suppose. 
Q. And what exactly did she tell you? 
A. That I'd left that — that you guys were going to 
file a motion to suppress. And I asked what the issue was, 
and she explained it to me. 
Q. How did she explain it to you? 
A. That my testimony — I left part of the Miranda out. 
Q. All right. And what did you tell her in response to 
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that? 
A. That I was nervous and that I was interrupted. 
Q. You told her that? 
A, I told her — no, I am sorry. I told her that I was 
nervous. 
Q, Did she tell you that you were interrupted? 
A. No. 
Q, Did she suggest to you that as an explanation? 
A, No. 
Q. At any point? 
A. No. 
Q. How many conversations have you had with her about 
your testimony in the preliminary hearing? 
A. This one today before the hearing, and then just 
right after that last hearing. 
Q. So several times? 
A. Twice. 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due pro-
cess of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, 
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or 
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, 
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protection.] 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
4# [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the Confed-
eracy and claims not to be paid.] 
5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws. 
